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The Historicity of Peirce’s
Classification of the Sciences
Chiara Ambrosio
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I am grateful to Tullio Viola for the suggestion to participate in this much needed project
on Pragmatism and the Writing of History. His enthusiasm, scholarly dedication and
precious commentary genuinely helped this article come to life. A version of my initial
thoughts on Peirce’s classification of the sciences was presented at the Sixth Conference
of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice at Rowan University. I am grateful to
my co-panellists Matthew Lund, Jouni Matti Kuukkanen, Hasok Chang, as well as to the
audience present at the session “In Pursuit of History: Philosophy of Science and the
Practice of Historiography” for their lively and collegial comments on this work. Alex
Csiszar kindly shared with me his thoughts on the classification of the sciences, as well as
some precious chapters of his PhD thesis. My PhD student Claudia Cristalli read an early
draft of this piece and provided extensive and thought-provoking comments, of the kind
that made me question the direction of our supervisor-supervisee collaboration. Two
anonymous referees provided invaluable suggestions to improve the quality of the
arguments I present in this article, and I am deeply indebted to their constructive
comments. Last but not least, Niall Le Mage put up once more with the domestic and
emotional consequences of my obsession for Peirce. For this – and much more – I am
grateful. A large part of this article was written in the summer 2016 at the Houghton
Library in Harvard, in the days leading up to the results of the Brexit referendum. As an
European academic based in the UK, I was deeply affected by the outcome of the vote. I
sat outside Peirce’s house in Cambridge on the day following the results, thinking that
Peirce’s Pragmaticist invitation to evaluate the conceivable consequences of adopting
certain conceptions matters today more than ever. We are still a long way from releasing
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim from our ivory tower and letting it out in the world, and it is
my hope that the theme of this special issue will be a first step in this direction.
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1 Decoding and systematising  Peirce’s  classification of  the  sciences  has  been a  central
concern for Peirce scholars. At least since Beverley Kent’s landmark study Charles S. Peirce:
Logic  and  the  Classification  of  the  Sciences  (Kent  1987),  Peirce’s  classification  has  been
regarded as the key to solve some of the most complex puzzles surrounding his approach
to logic, epistemology and metaphysics. From its relation to Peirce’s ‘architectonics’ to its
function in supporting his broader, thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism, from its crucial
role in articulating and defining the limits and scope of the normative sciences to its
interconnections with the development of the three categories, the classification of the
sciences has been the backdrop against which scholars have tested their broader claims
about the most fundamental aspects of Peirce’s philosophy.
2 In this article, I want to explore the early life of Peirce’s classification, and propose an
alternative  account  of  its  role  and  function  in  Peirce’s philosophical  thought.  More
specifically, I want to suggest – somewhat controversially – that Peirce’s classification of
the sciences is  characterised by a  distinctive historicity,  a  feature that  aligns Peirce’s
project with what Vincent Colapietro (1998: 129) has defined as the “historical thickness”
of the Pragmatist outlook more broadly. I use ‘historicity’ in two complementary senses
in  the  course  of  my  discussion.  On  one  hand,  I  aim  to  re-contextualise  Peirce’s
classification and investigate it as a quintessentially nineteenth century pursuit. In doing
this, I highlight a glaring limitation in the scholarship on Peirce – a limitation that is
particularly evident in the case of  the classification of  the sciences,  but has rippling
effects on the ways in which Peirce’s philosophy has been read and interpreted more
broadly. Even the rare and isolated accounts that somehow place Peirce’s classification in
context (see for example Kent 1987: Ch. 2), do so in a distinctively internalist manner, thus
segregating and separating Peirce’s project from the hundreds of attempts at classifying
the sciences that occupied the scientific community throughout the nineteenth century.
Peirce himself, in a later note which will turn out to be quite important for my argument,
admits to have examined “upward of a hundred attempts to classify the sciences” (R 1597:
5396 verso). Thus my first question – a question that Peirce scholars do not seem to have
asked  yet  in  regard  to  Peirce’s  classification  –  is:  why  would  Peirce  as  a  scientific
practitioner and a philosopher, but most importantly as a historical actor in a precise
historical context, worry about classifying the sciences?
3 The second sense in which I stress the historicity of Peirce’s classification follows directly
from the point I raised above. Establishing that Peirce’s project did not develop in a void
should lead us to consider the consequences of a historical account of his classification on
its very content and systematisation. Here what I propose is to look at Peirce’s project
from  the  viewpoint  of  historical  epistemology,  and  flesh  out  the  contingent  and
contextual nature of his classification as well as the historical and dynamic approach that
he develops, from his classification of the sciences, to the issue of classification more
broadly. The classification of the sciences, in this sense, becomes a paradigmatic example
of the importance of  a historical  reading of  Peirce for the purpose of  understanding
Peirce’s own historical works. 
4 Historical epistemology, I will argue, casts new light on several characteristics that Peirce
attributes to his classification. For example, it renders quite unsurprising the fact that
Peirce insists on wanting to develop a ‘natural’ classification: he is certainly not alone in
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using this qualification, and an important line of inquiry consists precisely in spelling out
how this characterisation relates to, or departs from, the widespread rhetoric around
producing ‘natural’ classifications of the sciences in the nineteenth century.
5 An important part of my argument will revolve around an apparently curious detail that
has  remained  so  far  unnoticed  in  the  early  history  of  Peirce’s  classification  of  the
sciences. An early version of the classification appears as the preface to the first Lowell
Lecture in the history of science, which Peirce delivered in the autumn of 1892 (R 1274a:
2).  This  is  not  a  mere  coincidence,  I  will  argue,  nor  should  it  be  taken as  a  simple
historical curiosity. One of Peirce’s main concerns is indeed to highlight the temporal
dimension of  his  classification:  the fact  that  classification is  inevitably  bound to  the
present state of science, at best “looking forward just a little” (R 1597: 5396 verso). As a
preface to what would eventually become Peirce’s larger project of a (never published)
history of science, the classification of the sciences occupies a central methodological and
historiographical function – one that is still of crucial importance to historical practice
today: that of reminding the historian of the inescapable presentism that characterises
the  very  starting  point  of  historical  inquiry.  Examining  this  apparently  puzzling
consideration  from  the  standpoint  of  historical  epistemology,  however,  is  a  way  of
turning this aspect of Peirce’s thought from a potential limitation to a historiographical
strength. Peirce’s placing a version of the classification of the sciences as the starting
point of his history of science is a significant epistemic move aimed at recasting the
function of classification as the (contingent) starting point of historical inquiry, and as
the very “angle of vision” (Colapietro 1996: 137) that allows the historian to frame and
refine her/his hypotheses about the past.
 
Disciplining the Sciences in the Nineteenth Century
6 The scholarship on Peirce’s classification of the sciences usually concentrates on the form
his classificatory system displayed in the early 1900s. Beverley Kent’s discussion of the
diagrammatic  nature  of  Peirce’s  scheme,  for  example,  takes  the  1903  version of  the
classification as a turning point, labelling it as Peirce’s ‘perennial’  classification (Kent
1987:  121ff).  Douglas Anderson’s (1995) examination of Peirce’s classification similarly
privileges the 1903 version,  and investigates in particular the place of  philosophy in
Peirce’s system. Helmut Pape (1993) focuses instead on the 1902 version, to show the
relation between what Peirce defines as ‘natural classes’ and his account of final causes.
More recently,  Richard Atkins (2006) has proposed a critical comparison between the
1902 classification presented by Peirce in chapter 2 of  the Minute Logic and the 1903
version contained in “An Outline Classification of the Sciences.” His argument revolves
around Peirce’s mature formulation of the categories as a guiding classificatory principle,
and shows that by 1903 Peirce realised that, along with being found in the sciences, “the
categories may also be used to classify  the sciences” (Atkins 2006:  484).  This  body of
literature  has  cast  substantial  light  on  the  metaphysical,  epistemological  and  logical
implications of Peirce’s classificatory scheme. Questions such as the role of logic amongst
the normative sciences, as well as its relation with mathematics (De Waal 2005) and its
dependence on ethics (Legg 2014; Bellucci & Pietarinen 2016), have taken centre stage –
and rightly so, as they form the core and the culmination of Peirce’s mature philosophical
system. 
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7 Most of the accounts of Peirce’s work on classification outlined so far, however, have as a
primary focus the internal consistency of Peirce’s scheme with key developments in his
logic,  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  This  also  explains  the  emphasis  on  Peirce’s
1902-1903 versions of the classification of the sciences: it is at this point that Peirce’s
phaneroscopy and his three categories mark an important development in his entire
philosophy, with crucial  consequences on his distinctive formulation of Pragmaticism
(specifically renamed, and reframed, in opposition to James’ version of Pragmatism). My
account  of  Peirce’s  classification,  on the other  hand,  starts  from different,  historical
premises. My aim is not to argue against the achievements of Peirce’s scholarship so far,
nor do I want to propose a radically alternative interpretation of the development of
Peirce’s classificatory system. What I intend to point out, however, is a common omission
in the literature, an omission that can be easily rectified by paying more attention to
Peirce’s place in the history of science. A historical approach, I contend, might hopefully
open up new avenues of inquiry compatible with the current philosophical literature on
the classification of the sciences. More specifically, I want to suggest the possibility that
Peirce’s work on and with the classification of the sciences was as much an effort toward
internal consistency as it was a response to external constraints and pressures directly
related to the social organization of the sciences in the nineteenth century. I hope to
show  that  the  classification  of  the  sciences,  far  from  being  a  philosophical  pursuit
conducted in isolation, is more productively investigated as Peirce’s effort to balance and
reconcile  the  internal  consistency  of  his  scheme  with  broader,  external  trends  to
reconfigure the sciences and their relationships as a conduit to social order.
8 The nineteenth century saw a proliferation of classifications of the sciences. From Jeremy
Bentham  to  André-Marie  Ampère,  from  William  Whewell  to  August  Comte,  Herbert
Spencer, Wilhelm Wundt and Karl Pearson (to name only a few figures well known to
Peirce), classifying the sciences became a distinctive nineteenth-century pursuit and a
scientific and philosophical genre in its own right. Arguably, attempts at mapping and
ordering knowledge date  at  least  as  far  back to  Aristotle  (a  fact  that  Peirce  himself
recognises – see for instance R 1336, a manuscript to which I shall return later). But in the
nineteenth century, and specifically from the 1820s onward, the pursuit of classifying the
sciences acquired a distinctive epistemological significance in relation to the growing
specialisation of science and the emergence of disciplines (Schaffer 2013). Most of the
classifications of the time open with an attack to the traditional Baconian organisation of
knowledge on the basis of the three faculties of memory, imagination and reason, as well
as its legacy in the eighteenth century. “Such scales as those of Bacon and D’Alembert are
constructed upon an arbitrary division of the faculties of the mind,” wrote August Comte
in presenting his own classification (Comte 1853: 18), pointing out their inadequacy to the
present state of the positive sciences. Negotiating the relationship between the sciences
in the nineteenth century was in line with broader efforts toward standardisation and the
politics  of  scientific  measurement,  as  well  as  with  political  discourses  around  the
internationalisation of science and the need of communicating scientific results through
an emergent international network of scientific periodicals.1 It is indeed rather odd that
even historians of science have paid little attention to such a widespread trend in the
nineteenth century.2 The most up-to-date study on this issue is an extensive discussion of
the  “classifying  moment”  in  nineteenth-century  science  by  Alex  Csiszar  (2010).
Interestingly, Peirce features as a key player in his narrative – a detail I shall return to in
the next sections.
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9 Csiszar (2010: 350ff) distinguishes two related aims behind the impulse to classify the
sciences – a bureaucratic aim and an epistemic aim. Philosophical attempts to classify the
sciences emerged in parallel to a more general reorganisation of scientific knowledge,
one that was dictated by a growing bureaucratic need to survey and index all existing
publications for a complete picture of the scientific landscape of the time. Led by the
Royal Society in England, this proposal was as much a bibliographical exercise as it was an
exercise  in  diplomacy:  indeed,  the Royal  Society  sought  the  collaboration  of  similar
international institutions, such as the Académie des Sciences, the Smithsonian Institution
and various German state academies. The First International Catalogue Conference, held
in London in 1896, was the culmination of this international effort, with the launch of the
International  Catalogue of  Scientific  Literature  in 1901.  “During this  period,”  Csiszar
claims,  “scientists,  politicians  and  bibliographers  became  close  collaborators  and
competitors in the race to classify the world’s scientific literature” (Csiszar 2010: 352).
This is the time in which Melvil Dewey’s now famous decimal indexing system emerged as
the golden international standard for the efficient organisation of offices and libraries
(Csiszar 2010: 366); it is also a time when similar indexing projects were extended to the
classification of people, as in the case of Alphonse Bertillon’s system of index cards to
classify criminals and Francis Galton’s system to record and retrieve the fingerprints of
repeat offenders (Sekula 1986; Csiszar 2013). 
10 Toward the  end of  the  nineteenth century,  Csiszar  argues,  the  bureaucratic  need to
survey the sciences merged with a distinctively epistemological urge to give a philosophical
foundation to what thus far had been a quest for efficiency in international coordination.
Indexes of the scientific literature were initially arranged in alphabetical order, but this
was found inadequate for the purpose of classifying scientific knowledge. Finding a system
of epistemological categories that would govern the relationships between the sciences
became an essential task to legitimise philosophically the place and authority of science
in nineteenth-century society. Mapping the current state of knowledge was ultimately
aimed at producing an empirical image of science, in a movement that Csiszar interprets
as simultaneously social and epistemological (Csiszar 2010: 370). It is at this point that
bureaucratic classification joined forces with the proliferation of attempts at producing
philosophical classifications of knowledge, guided by distinctive philosophical categories,
that had emerged in philosophical discourse at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
11 The  philosophical  drive  toward  classification,  at  least  in  the  first  quarter  of  the
nineteenth  century,  went  hand  in  hand  with  educational  reform.  A  version  of  the
classification of the sciences appears in the fourth appendix of Bentham’s Chrestomathia 
(1817), and it is specifically tailored to the ‘useful knowledge’ that Bentham’s educational
proposal  was  supposed to  instigate  in  the  British middle  classes.3 In  a  long opening
preamble to his classification, Bentham revises D’Alembert’s ‘Encyclopaedial Tree’ from
the Encyclopédie (modelled, unsurprisingly, on Bacon’s classification) and reorganises the
sciences on the basis of their utility. Mapping the current state of knowledge was for him
also aimed at distilling which subjects qualified as most useful: knowledge of Latin and
Greek,  which  Bentham  himself  mastered,  was  considered  dispensable,  for  instance,
whereas  the  natural  sciences,  mathematics  and  ‘technology’4 were  considered  most
fundamental.  Bentham’s  Chrestomatic  project  was  directly  related,  and  indeed
specifically tailored to his proposal for a monitorial school which would accommodate up
to a thousand pupils at a time. Bentham’s school, the educational version of his Panopticon
,  was  planned so  that  older  students  would  teach younger  ones,  in  a  system where
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everyone could monitor and be monitored (Bentham 1983: 104).  The ultimate control
would  be  in  the  hands  of  a  single  teacher-master.  The  monitorial  system  fulfilled
perfectly Bentham’s principle of maximising utility, being a way of saving time, money,
and of increasing the “relative aptitude” of the pupils themselves (Bentham 1983: 102). 
12 In one of the most detailed studies of Bentham’s Chrestomathia, Elissa Itzkin (1978) has
shown  that  proposals  for  monitorial  schools  were  popular  in  England  well  before
Bentham’s. They initially emerged as a measure to cope with the shortage of teachers and
the increase of the population, but soon acquired a distinctive social purpose: to apply the
division of labour to intellectual and educational life. “Like the steam engine or spinning
machinery, [the monitorial school] diminishes labour and multiples work,” wrote Andrew
Bell,  one of the initiators of the monitorial project, assimilating the enterprise to the
construction of an “intellectual and moral engine” (Bell 1808: 36).5 It is therefore not a
surprise that Bentham’s classification of the sciences is aligned with criteria of utility and
control that were inextricably related to the demands of a new industrial  society.  In
several  respects,  Itzkin  concludes,  Bentham’s  envisaged  school  “was  reminiscent  of
scenes from Dickens’ Hard Times” (Itzkin 1978: 315). 
13 Bentham died in 1832; only two years later, in an article in the Quarterly Review, William
Whewell described the current scientific landscape as “a great empire falling to pieces”
(Whewell 1834: 59). The image of science and its place in British culture was changing
rapidly, and so was the role of the classification of the sciences. Whewell had coined the
term ‘scientist’ in 1833 precisely as a remedy to the fragmentation of the ‘commonwealth
of  science,’  a  concern  he  shared  with  the  members  of  the  newly-founded  British
Association.6 As Richard Yeo (1993) has pointed out, the early Victorian period was a time
in which the social and intellectual conditions of science invited a public ‘metascientific’
reflection on its status as a distinctive form of knowledge. Whewell’s classification of the
sciences, published in the second volume of his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, is part
of a much larger project, one aimed at securing the legitimacy of a field that was still
strongly in competition with natural theology on one side, and the classics on the other.
Famously conversant in all these fields,7 Whewell was uniquely positioned to serve as a
mediator as well as an indefatigable advocate of the necessity of a distinctive space for
science and a distinctive identity for its practitioners in society. 
14 Whewell’s classification is explicitly framed as following from his earlier History of the
Inductive Sciences (1857 [1837]). Indeed, history is a central classificatory criterion, which
allowed Whewell to differentiate his scheme from others primarily in light of its focus on
a historicised notion of ideas:
The Classification thus obtained depends neither upon the faculties of the mind to
which the separate parts of our knowledge owe their origins, nor upon the objects
which  each  science  contemplates,  but  upon  a  more  natural  and  fundamental
element; namely the Ideas which each science involves. (Whewell 1847: 278)
15 Ideas regulate and connect facts, and form a ‘natural’ foundation for reasoning in each
science. To each fundamental idea or conception corresponds a particular science – thus
for example the fundamental conception of Space corresponds to Geometry,  which is
then grouped by Whewell under the “Pure Mathematical Sciences” (see fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Whewell’s Classification of the sciences (1847: 281)
The British Library
16 By making his system ‘naturally’ led by ideas, rather than objects, Whewell also fulfilled
another  important  aim:  that  of  accounting  for  the  diversity  of  what  qualifies  as  a
‘fundamental  conception’  for  each science.  His  classification is  thus  profoundly  anti-
reductionist, in the sense that it aims at distilling the distinctive uniformity in which
knowledge is achieved in each field. Thus, Whewell explains, it may be that the idea of
Number, fundamental to the science of Arithmetic, is but a modification of the idea of
Time; or the idea of Force is a modification of the idea of Cause. The purpose of classifying
the sciences, however, is not to find an absolute measure for deciding which of these
ideas or conceptions is more fundamental, and subsequently arrange the sciences on the
basis  of  that  absolute  parameter.  On the  contrary  –  and here  it  becomes  clear  that
‘natural’ for Whewell is a qualification that aims to validate the distinctive identity of
scientific practitioners – fundamental conceptions are contingent upon the specificities
and needs of each science.  This particular sense of ‘natural’  classification is one that
Peirce will adopt and articulate in detail in his own classificatory system. 
17 While British classifications reflected the emergence of specialisation and the concerns
arising from the division of industrial  labour,  the politics of the French system were
closely aligned with the aftermath of the Napoleonic era. The end of the empire in 1815
saw  Paris  reawakening  to  literary  and  philosophical  influences,  especially  German
Romanticism,  which  had  been  heavily  censored  under  Napoleon.  Power  remained
centralised in the capital, which also became a node at the intersection between literary
and  philosophical  movements,  social  reform  and  industrial  and  technological
developments.  It  is  in  this  context  that  André-Marie  Ampère  and  Auguste  Comte
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developed their own classifications of the sciences, two examples of the distinctive form
that the interaction between philosophy and science took in the French national context.
18 Ampère’s classification formed a central part of his two-volume Essai sur la Philosophie des
Sciences (1834-1843). He regarded the Essai as the culmination of his work as a scientist as
well  as  a  philosopher,  and indeed his  classification reflects  more  broadly  his  strong
Kantian commitments.  Here the sciences are classified on the basis of the opposition
between world and mind: the most fundamental distinction Ampère outlines is between
sciences  cosmologiques,  or  cosmological  sciences,  engaged in the study of  the  material
world, and sciences noologiques, or sciences of the ‘understanding’ (Ampère 1834: 28). Each
of  these  realms was  then further  divided in  sous-règnes  and embranchemens:  the  sub-
realms of cosmological science, for example, were ‘proper cosmology,’ which branched
out into mathematics and physics, and ‘physiology,’ which branched out into natural and
medical physiology. Each branch was subsequently divided into sub-embranchemens and
then sciences of ‘the first order’: for example, arithmetic and geometry were sciences of
the first order deriving from the sub-embranchement of mathematics ‘properly construed’
(see fig. 2). Lastly, first order sciences were even further distinguished into second and
third order sciences: arithmetical analysis, for example, was classified as a third order
science deriving from the science of elementary arithmetic.
 
Fig. 2. André-Marie Ampère (1834), Classification des Connaissances Humaines, in appendix to the
Essai sur la Philosophie des Sciences
The British Library
19 In one of the very few detailed studies of Ampère’s classification,  John Tresch (2012)
shows how the system outlined in the Essai is itself the culmination of Ampère’s long-
standing  reflections  on  the  unity  of  nature.  Tresch  reverts  the  standard  image  of
Ampère’s scientific research on electromagnetism as a triumph of empiricism and reason,
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and relates it instead to his immersion in German Naturphilosophie, which he absorbed
primarily via the electromagnetic research of Hans Christian Oersted, as well as the unity
of mind and nature outlined in Friedrich Schelling’s philosophy of nature. While Ampère
did  maintain  the  distinction  between  mind  and  matter  in  his  research  on
electromagnetism (and to a certain extent this distinction remains visible through his
separation between sciences  cosmologiques and sciences  noologiques in his  classification),
Tresch shows that he simultaneously built an “activist epistemology” (Tresch 2012: 54)
that  served  as  a  bridge  between  empiricist  and  romantic  ideals.  “The  conceptual
malleability and ubiquity of the ‘cosmic substance’ of electricity,” Tresch claims, “made it
analogous to his efforts to form a classificatory system that would contain the entire
cosmos: a single taxonomy uniting all fields of knowledge” (Tresch 2012: 32). The theme
of unity – unity of the sciences as well as unity of nature – is absolutely central to a range
of efforts to classify the sciences in the nineteenth century, and will play a crucial role in
Peirce’s own system. 
20 The strongest influence on Peirce’s classification of the sciences was Comte’s scheme,
famously presented in the Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830-1842).8 Overshadowed by the
neo-positivism of the 1920s (a movement that never quite expressed a precise position
regarding its relationship with Comte’s positivism, perhaps because it did not quite have
one),9 Comte’s philosophy is only recently enjoying a revival. The most striking aspect of
his original formulation of positivism is the marriage of positive philosophy and positive
polity: his contributions to philosophy of science cannot be fully appreciated unless they
are placed in relation to his ideas about social and political reform. In a similar vein, the
Comtean classification of the sciences, far from being a reductionist attempt at grounding
sociology in the natural sciences, was part of a broader project of educational reform
specifically aiming to oppose the intellectual division of labour, at the same time doing
justice  to  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  sciences  in  their  relation  to  each  other
(Bourdeau 2015,  np).  Thus understood, the pursuit of classifying the sciences was for
Comte an explicit response to the apparent fragmentation of the scientific landscape of
his time, in a manner that renders his work quite close in spirit and aims to Whewell’s. 
21 Comte saw his classification of the sciences as a development of his law of the three
stages. His key idea was that the development of human thought was marked by three
successive stages: the theological – where the final causes of phenomena are explained by
an appeal to the supernatural; the metaphysical – a transitory stage where the appeal to
the supernatural is replaced by an appeal to abstract entities; and finally the positive
stage – where the mind refrains from looking for ultimate causes and limits itself to the
observation and description of the laws and regularities that govern nature. “What is now
understood when we speak of an explanation of facts,” Comte maintains, “is simply the
establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts, the
number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science” (Comte 1853: 2).10
While the three stages marked – dynamically – the progress of the human intellect in the
constitution of the sciences, the classification offered a picture of their order, which also
served to recapitulate their dynamic progress (Pickering 1993: 203). 
22 Comte’s  classification  placed  the  sciences  on  a  ladder  in  order  of  abstractness  or
generality (as I will show later on, this was a contentious point, which triggered a heated
polemic with Herbert Spencer). It started from mathematics, the most abstract of the
sciences, and continued with astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and social physics or
sociology. More concrete sciences depended on more abstract ones, but for Comte this did
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not entail a form of reductionism (or materialism, as he referred to it). The way Comte
justified his anti-reductionist standpoint with respect to the relationship between the
sciences  was  by  underlining  their  irreducible  diversity,  but  also  through an  explicit
appeal to history,  which he regarded as the primary method to conduct the positive
science of sociology. On one hand, he clearly specified that each of the sciences in his
scheme was characterised by distinctive objects, concepts and methods. On the other,
while the tendency toward reductionism might appear itself historically motivated by the
sciences  capitalising  on  each  other’s  findings,  Comte  maintained  that  this  was
counterbalanced by each science resisting invasion in order to secure and maintain the
distinctiveness of its subject matter (Bourdeau 2015). 
23 The most adamant critic of Comte’s classification at the time was the British biologist and
philosopher Herbert Spencer. Comte and Spencer’s classifications have been regarded as
complementary attempts at generating a ‘grand synthesis’ of knowledge, in a tradition
that dates back at least to George Sarton’s tribute to Spencer, written for the centenary of
his birth (Sarton 1920). But Spencer himself also spent most of his later career distancing
his own philosophy from Comte’s positivism, and the classification of the sciences became
the contentious ground over which he fought this intellectual  battle.11 The essay The
Classification of the Sciences, to Which are Added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of
M. Comte (1864) outlines in detail the main points of Spencer’s disagreement with Comte.
A contentious issue, for Spencer, was the supposed linearity of Comte’s classification.
Spencer  found  Comte’s  ladder  artificial  and  arbitrary:  its  serial  arrangement  of  the
sciences offered no evidence of the natural relationship of filiation between them. This
was already outlined in Spencer’s 1854 essay “The Genesis of Science,” in the course of a
long digression on Comte’s classification. The Classification of the Sciences took up Spencer’s
earlier  criticism  and  supplemented  it  with  additional  arguments  and  an  alternative
classificatory  system.  A  ‘true’  classification,  Spencer  explains,  should  be  based  on
likenesses  amongst  the  objects  grouped  in  each  class:  “If  […]  the  Sciences  admit  of
classification at  all” Spencer explains,  “it  must be by grouping together the like and
separating the unlike” (Spencer 1864: 4). ‘Like’ and ‘unlike,’ in turn, are defined in terms
of ‘essential attributes’ shared by the members of a certain class, in a quasi-essentialist
argument about classification: 
For things that possess the greatest number of attributes in common, are things
that possess in common those essential attributes on which the rest depend; and,
conversely,  the  possession  in  common  of  the  essential  attributes  implies  the
possession in common of the greatest number of attributes. (Spencer 1864: 4) 
24 An immediately related criticism is that Comte uses interchangeably ‘abstractness’ and
‘generality’  in  his  discussion of  the  organisation of  the  sciences.  For  Spencer  this  is
evidence  of  the  fact  that  Comte’s  classification  arranged  the  sciences  in  a  purely
subjective, artificial order: “Abstractness is detachment from particular cases,” whereas
“generality means manifestation in numerous cases” (Spencer 1864: 7). In conflating the
two, Spencer argued, Comte neglects the fact that abstraction requires paying attention
to essential attributes, separated from “the phenomena which disguise [them]” (Spencer
1864:  7).  In  open response to  Comte’s  supposed conflation,  Spencer  used ‘degrees  of
abstraction,’ thus redefined, as the fundamental criterion for his reorganisation of the
sciences. Thus, ‘Abstract sciences’ deal with the forms in which phenomena are known to
us:  these  are  logic  and  mathematics.  ‘Abstract-concrete’  sciences  treat  phenomena
themselves  in their  elements  –  they “generalise  the laws of  relation which different
modes  of  Matter  and  Motion  conform  to”  (Spencer  1864:  14).  Physics,  mechanics,
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chemistry  fall  within  this  second  class.  Lastly,  entirely  concrete  sciences  treat
phenomena themselves in their totalities: “the subject-matter of these Concrete Sciences
is  the  Real,  as  contrasted  with the  wholly  or  partially  ideal”  (Spencer  1864:  18).
Astronomy, geology, biology, psychology and sociology are all concrete sciences in this
sense. 
25 The Comte-Spencer controversy is indicative of the many issues at stake in the debate
around the classification of the sciences in the second half of the nineteenth century.
What is often portrayed as a clash of characters – a then already profoundly spiritual
Comte,  not  particularly  receptive  to  Spencer’s  criticisms,  versus  a  stubborn Spencer,
irritated by the constant references to Comte in reviews and reactions to his work, even
by his close friends George Eliot and George Henry Lewes – was in earnest a clash of
worldviews on how science should be conducted. This aspect of the debate emerges in a
particularly forceful way in a letter from Spencer to Lewes, himself a persistent advocate
of the commonalities between the two philosophers:
What  is  Comte’s  professed  aim?  To  give  a  coherent  account  of  the  progress  of
human conceptions. What is my aim? To give a coherent account of the progress of
the external world. Comte proposes to describe the necessary, and the actual, filiation
of  the  ideas.  I  propose  to describe  the  necessary,  and  actual,  filiation  of  things.
Comte professes to interpret the genesis of our knowledge of nature.  My aim is to
interpret, as far as possible, the genesis of the phenomena which constitute nature.
The one end is subjective. The other is objective. (Spencer 1904: 570)
26 Where Spencer saw his classification as an objective matter, in alignment with the order
of nature, Comte’s system assumed the limitations of human knowledge as the starting
point – and defining characteristic – of any attempt to systematise the sciences. Indeed,
by arranging the sciences on a scale of increasing complexity, Comte aimed to reconnect
general phenomena (as those studied by astronomy) with the variability and complexity
of phenomena that were closer to humans, as those studied by sociology. 
27 Yet, interpreting Comte and Spencer’s classifications exclusively as a standard instance of
the scientific polarisation around the categories of objectivity and subjectivity will not do
full  justice  to  what  they,  along  with  Bentham,  Whewell,  Ampère,  and  many  other
nineteenth-century  classifiers  (including  Peirce!)  were  trying  to  achieve  with  their
classifications.  The appeal  to objectivity in defence of  the superiority of  a  particular
classificatory system, well exemplified here by Spencer’s curt statement, is a rhetorical
gesture that needs to be contextualised in the broader conceptual and cultural space of
nineteenth-century attempts at coordinating knowledge more broadly. These attempts
were at once social and epistemological, and ultimately converged into what Lorraine
Daston and Peter  Galison (2009)  have characterised as  the  image of  ‘a  many-headed
knower’:  the kind of  scientific  self  emerging from the realisation of  the distinctively
collective  nature  of  scientific  objectivity  as  a  virtue  and  a  guide  to  the  scientific
enterprise. “This is a problem of the division of labour and the multiplication of knowers”
Daston and Galison claim, “akin to any other such problem in the organisation of work:
how to analyse a complex inquiry into modular parts, finding willing and able hands to
undertake each part, and efficiently integrate the results” (Daston & Galison 2009: 297).
Among the examples of this impulse toward coordination they refer to the Internationale
Grandmessung, an attempt at a complete measurement of the shape and dimensions of
the Earth – a grandiose project to which Peirce himself contributed while employed at the
US Geodetic and Coast Survey. Nineteenth-century classifications of the sciences add an
additional layer to the picture about coordination provided by Daston and Galison, as
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they  offer  a  ‘many-headed  rationale’  for  adjudicating how labour  should  be  divided
without compromising the fundamental unity of the scientific enterprise,  and a clear
view that this process of adjudication was primarily marked by irreducible disagreements
of the kind that saw Spencer against Comte, or Whewell against Bentham’s utilitarianism.
Fighting over the superiority of a classification was as much an epistemological, meta-
scientific matter, as it was a statement about the national and international politics of
science, and who should be allowed to enter that debate. Peirce joined this discussion
relatively late, but it is precisely for this reason, I claim, that his classification demands to
be reconnected to the broader external context in which it was produced – a context in
which he played the role of witness as well as that of a directly involved practitioner.
 
Peirce’s Classification, c1892
My own classification is a direct reformation of that of Comte. I imitate Comte in
making chemistry follow directly after general physics, as a specialization of it, in
making  biology  a  specialization  of  chemistry,  but  on  a  ground  that  was  not
understood  at  Comte’s  time,  namely  that  biology  is  merely  an  account  of  the
properties  of  protoplasm which is  a  class  of  chemical  substances.  I  also imitate
Comte in making sciences of organizations and organisms follow after sciences of
classifications  of  individuals.  But  I  separate  from  Comte,  in  making  pure
mathematics  a  science,  in  making  philosophy  a  science,  in  recognizing  the
psychical sciences as a series parallel to the physical sciences, in recognizing the
descriptive sciences in general, and not merely astronomy, and in transposing them
from the first to the last place and in recognizing the practical sciences. (R 1336
c1892: 4)
28 Thus Peirce characterised his project of compiling a classification of the sciences, in a
manuscript  entitled  “Philosophy  in  Light  of  the  Logic  of  Relatives”  (c1892).  The
manuscript,  briefly  discussed by  Kent  (1987),  is  by no means  his  earliest  attempt  at
classifying the sciences.12 Kent dismisses it  rather quickly,  qualifying it  as one of the
several instances in which Peirce reflects on the place of philosophy in his classification,
and concluding that it offers evidence of how “exhibiting the relations of a given science
to various other sciences indicates some of the conceivable effects of that science” (Kent
1987:  52).  Hidden  between  the  lines,  however,  there  is  a  far  broader  set  of  claims
advanced by Peirce in this particular piece of writing, claims that are not in contradiction
with the pragmaticist relevance – that is, the ‘conceivable effects’ – of singling out the
role of philosophy amongst the sciences. 
29 I want to argue that this manuscript is important in the context of Peirce’s classification,
partly because it is one of the instances in which Peirce openly discusses the relationship
of  his  proposed system to  Comte’s,  but  primarily  because  the  rhetorical  strategy he
pursues in articulating such relationship is a clear attempt at positioning himself, as a
philosopher and as a scientist, within the broader late nineteenth-century philosophical
and institutional debate around the status and current shape of scientific knowledge. “It
is incumbent upon every philosopher in order to make himself understood,” Peirce states
only a few lines earlier, “to explain in what way he came up with his ideas. For we must
all submit to be classified and ultimately to be pigeon-holed” (R1336: 3). This is an initial
indication of a point that has been overlooked in the literature on Peirce’s classification:
Peirce is here using his classification of the sciences as a form of ‘currency’ to secure his
identity  and status  in  the  very  community  of  classifiers  to  which  he  is  offering  his
contribution.  He also shows to be well  aware that  offering a  classification is  itself  a
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pathway  toward  being  pigeon-holed:  along  with  their  objects,  classifications  classify
classifiers. Peirce’s statement, however, does not imply an absolute inevitability in this
process: by making his commitments explicit (however rhetorically coated they may be,
or  perhaps  precisely  via  this  rhetorical  move),  he  is  steering  the  recipients  of  his
classification toward including him into a particular pigeon-hole rather than others. This
becomes even clearer a few lines later where, for example, he takes a precise position in
the Spencer-Comte dispute: “Herbert Spencer attempted to reform Comte’s classification,
but in my opinion not with sufficient power to repay study” (R1336: 4). 
30 Contrary to Spencer,  Peirce finds Comte’s  idea that  the sciences should be classified
according to their degrees of abstractness sound and quite unproblematic. He does not
dwell upon the distinction between abstractness and generality, but this may be because
the distinction for Spencer was an opportunity to advance a quasi-essentialist view of
classification, which Peirce did not endorse.13 Peirce reads Comte’s emphasis on ‘degrees
of abstractness’ in a distinctively differential way: 
We desire to have our classification as significant as possible. That is to say, we
desire that,  over  and above,  those characters  of  the different  classes  of  science
which serve to delimit them and to discriminate from one another, they should
have as many interesting extra points of distinction as possible; for the value of a
classification lies precisely in that. (R1336: 5-6)
31 A classification of  the sciences  should be ‘significant’  first  and foremost to scientific
practitioners. It should reflect differences, rather than similarities, between diverse fields
of inquiry, for it is through difference that each field defines and delimits itself. As I will
show later on in this section, here Peirce starts articulating a point that will  become
essential  to  his  subsequent  definition  of  a  ‘natural’  classification:  the  fact  that  a
significant classification should reflect the order of, and relations between, the various
sub-communities that constitute science. Peirce expands on this point even further:
We find the different sciences are separated to a great extent into different circles
of men who have comparatively little intercourse with one another. What makes
the specialist of one of these circles more competent to conduct certain inquiries
than a  man not  in  that  circle  is  that  he  is  trained to  that  sort  of  inquiry,  and
especially that he is competent to make a kind of observation that ordinary men
cannot make. He has the necessary apparatus and the necessary experience. Hence
it is that sciences are separated from one another largely by virtue of the different
kinds of observations upon which they are based. (R1336: 6)
32 What  Peirce  is  articulating  here  is  precisely  what  Csiszar  (2010:  370)  defined  as  an
attempt at  delineating an ‘empirical’  image of  science,  typical  of  nineteenth century
classifications.  As  practices  and  practitioners  form  the  empirical  content  of  a
classification of the sciences, it is to these that Peirce directs his attention. He singles out
observation as the discriminating factor not only to distinguish the sciences from each
other,  but  also  to  demarcate  science  from non-science.  In  stating that  scientists  are
‘competent to make a kind of observation that ordinary men cannot make,’ however, he
is not unquestioningly attributing authority to the field. Instead, he proposes that the
justification for the distinctive epistemic position attributed to science is to be found in
the extensive training that scientific practitioners must undergo in order to earn their
access to the community to which they aim to contribute. “Those who do not make a
given kind of observations,” Peirce continues, “are segregated from those who do; and
this  segregation tends  to  encourage the growth of  different  sets  of  ideas, and those
different sets of ideas will give special characters to methods of study and to the truths
they discover” (R1336: 6). Scientists have a privileged perspective upon a certain range of
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phenomena only insofar as they train themselves and each other to observe in particular
ways. This in turn is shaped by, and shapes, the conceptual and methodological direction
that different kinds of scientific inquiry take. The ‘segregation’ that Peirce mentions in
his statement is not a shortcoming of the specialisation of observation, but a crucially
enabling  factor  that  allows  different  sets  of  ideas  to  grow.  Peirce’s  emphasis  on
observation is thus clearly different from the ‘received view’ of positivism, a view he did
not endorse, even though he was familiar with its most sophisticated forms. However
sophisticated Comte’s account of observation might have been (see Laudan 1971),  for
example, his version of positivism featured observation as antithetical to metaphysics:
indeed the transition from the metaphysical to the positive stage was characterised for
Comte by a renewed role for the observational component of science as the precondition
to the identification and description of regularities in nature. Peirce, on the contrary, saw
observation and metaphysics as complementary, insofar as metaphysics was construed
itself as a science and conducted via experiment and reasoning (Haack 2007).
33 The contrast with positivist accounts of observation is visible in other writings by Peirce,
roughly contemporary to the discussion of the classification of the sciences contained in
R1336.  An illuminating  example  is  a  passage  from the  “Reply  to  the  Necessitarians”
(1893),14 which includes a targeted response to Paul Carus’ claim that Peirce’s logic of
science appears to be articulated in a positivistic spirit (CP 6.404). Peirce’s reply to Carus’
charge starts with a tongue-in-cheek statement about where his supposedly ‘positivistic’
influences might have come from, and ends with an appeal to history that turns Carus’
statement on its head:
Were I to name those of my teachers who were most positivistic in theory a smile
would be excited. My own historical studies, which have been somewhat minutely
critical,  have,  on  the  whole,  confirmed the  views  of  Whewell,  the  only  man of
philosophical  power  conjoined  with  scientific  training  who  had  made  a
comprehensive  survey  of  the  whole  course  of  science,  that  progress  in  science
depends upon the observation of the right facts by minds furnished with appropriate
ideas. (R1336: 6; emphasis in the original)
34 Here Peirce is referring to Whewell’s classification of the sciences, and specifically to the
view that ideas are the guiding principle of classification.  Just like in the case of the
organisation of the sciences, ideas offer a ‘natural’ guiding rationale for what should be
deemed  worthy  of  attention  and  selection  by  a  community  of  inquirers.  This  is
reminiscent  of  a  version of  what  philosophers  of  science,  following Norwood Russell
Hanson (1958),  would  now define  as the  ‘theory-ladenness  of  observation’;  however,
Peirce’s account is both broader and richer.15 A clarification of the sense in which Peirce
construes observation emerges, for example, in his 1898 lecture on “The First Rule of
Logic.”  This  particular  passage  is  revealing  because  here  Peirce  treats  the  role  of
observation in the context  of  a  discussion of  Whewell’s  account of  induction and its
differences from retroduction:
For what  is  observation? What  is  experience? It  is  the enforced element in  the
history of our lives. It is that which we are conscious of by an occult force residing
in an object which we contemplate. The act of observation is the deliberate yielding
of ourselves to that force majeure,  – an early surrender at discretion, due to our
foreseeing that we must, whatever we do, be borne down by that power, at last.
Now the surrender which we make in retroduction is a surrender to the insistence
of an idea. (EP2: 47)
35 Observation for Peirce is always interpretative – interpretation does not intervene upon
it as an add-on, but is built into it.  Thus, the factual component of observation (‘the
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enforced element in the history of our lives’) is not separate from the ideas that lend
observation an element of generality.16 In referring to Whewell’s appeal to ideas, Peirce is
therefore also accounting for the deep historicity that characterises modes and methods
of  observation  within  a  particular  community.  For  a  fundamental  consequence  of
building ideas into a theory of observation is that, construed in this way, observation
becomes  itself  an  inferential  and  semiotic  process  that  unfolds  through  time.
Interestingly, this aspect of Peirce’s account emerges far more clearly from passages in
which he outlines his disagreements with Whewell, which deserve a brief digression. 
36 One point on which Whewell should be corrected, Peirce explains in a manuscript written
for one of his 1892 Lowell lectures on the history of science, is that he remains hopelessly
vague on “the mode of origination of these ‘appropriate ideas’” (R1274a: 5): 
Whewell would say they spring from the nature of the mind. But the nature of the
mind is something itself due to an evolutionary process; and we want to know just
how these ideas came to be implemented in the nature of the mind. Besides, these
ideas have most of them grown up during the course of scientific history, and we
want  to  know  just  how  they  have  grown  up  and  under  what  general  agency.
(R1274a: 5)
37 What attracted Peirce to Whewell’s views on science was that, along with their explicit
emphasis  on  history,  they  ran  against  the  dominant  ‘vulgarisation’  of  Baconian
empiricism  which  was  dominant  in  nineteenth  century  America.17 As  Peter  Novick
explains:  “to the great majority of American philosophers and scientists Baconianism
meant in the first place a rigidly empirical approach: ‘observations’ were sacred” (Novick
1988:  34).  This  was  accompanied  by  a  meticulous  avoidance  of  hypotheses:  “it  was
unscientific to go beyond what could be directly observed, to ‘anticipate nature’” (Novick
1988: 34). What Peirce found in Whewell was an alternative to this rather crude form of
empiricism, one in which the chaos of empirical facts could be made meaningful through
the imposition of general ideas upon those facts. On the other hand, however, Peirce
points out that what Whewell seems to ignore is that ideas themselves undergo a process
of refinement and growth: the iterative complementarity of ideas and observations is at
the very basis of the historicity of both. “Whewell’s theory in its general statement,”
Peirce claims in the same manuscript, “is that to make a scientific discovery two things
are needful, 1st, facts drawn from without, and 2nd ideas drawn from within, appropriate
to the interpretation of those facts” (R1274a: 3). Whewell falls into the trap of separating
(external) observed facts from (internal) ideas, with the result of relegating observation
to a passive, subordinate affair. This has the paradoxical effect of rendering his approach
(at least to observation) remarkably close to the ‘vulgarisation’ of Baconian empiricism
which he purported to reject. Stating that ideas ‘grow’ is for Peirce at the same time a
way of avoiding the intuitionist connotations which he saw as implied in Whewell’s views,
18 and at the same time proposing a richer sense of observation, as consisting of an active
process of judgment and as a central part of the self-corrective nature of science. Indeed,
his critique of Whewell continues with a biological analogy, which clarifies even further
the distinctive historicity and complementarity of ideas and observations thus construed:
One  of  the  great  questions  in  biology  is  whether  acquired  characters  are  ever
transmitted. If we speak of acquired mental and moral qualities, it is the question of
whether training is of any use except to the individual. Whether, for instance, the
conception of space is a pure result of breeding that is of the survival of those who
possessed  it  early  at  birth,  or  whether  it  is  in  some measure  the  result  of  the
inheritance of the intellectual earnings of our forefathers. No direct investigation
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can afford a satisfactory answer to this question. It can only be resolved by studying
out the general modus operandi of intellectual development. (R1276a: 5-6)
38 It is not a coincidence that Peirce’s evolutionary example revolves around the role of
‘training’ (which is of paramount importance for Peirce’s classification of the sciences) as
the  contentious  middle-ground  between  biologically  and  intellectually  acquired
characters. Along with a useful example, the reference to ‘training’ here invokes skills
and habits that are developed and cultivated through observation as a primary vehicle of
‘the  intellectual  earnings  of  our  forefathers’.  A  direct  investigation of  our  biological
characteristics, Peirce remarks, will not set the balance between elements drawn ‘from
without’  and  elements  drawn  ‘from within,’  because  that  line  is  by  its  very  nature
blurred. The only way to answer the question, Peirce continues, is via historical inquiry: 
One thing, as it seems to me, the history of science renders abundantly clear, it is
that  man’s  native,  or  natural and  apparently  innate  ideas in  the  early  stages  of
intellectual  development,  were far  from being accurately  true.  They have to  be
subjected to a process of correction. (R1276a: 6-7, emphasis mine)
39 What Whewell took to be ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ ideas are themselves constantly evolving –
and as I will show below this adds a central tile to the puzzle of Peirce’s definition of a
‘natural’ classification of the sciences, too. Ideas grow as they are enriched and corrected
by observations, just as much as observations are by their very nature imbued with ideas. 
40 The complementarity  of  ideas  and observation is  an  important  point  where  Peirce’s
philosophy crosses paths with the tradition of  historical  epistemology,  a  tradition to
which  he  has  been  thus  far  associated  only  very  loosely  and  in  indirect  ways.  The
reference to Whewell’s  historical  works (even in the form of Peirce’s criticism to his
account of ideas) is particularly relevant here, as it shows that Peirce recognised the
value of scientific observation as a historically located practice and as a mode of inquiry
worthy of  investigation in its own right.  This is  a theme that has been revived only
recently in the history and philosophy of science, precisely by scholars working within
the framework of historical epistemology (Daston 2008; Daston & Lunbeck 2011). Lorraine
Daston’s idea of ‘collective empiricism,’ for example, offers an account of observation as a
practice that was highly discussed and theorised by scientific practitioners at least since
the seventeenth century,  to the point  that  it  became a scientific  genre with its  own
distinctive  connotations  and methodological  guidelines.  “Even when observation was
demoted  to  the  status  of  handmaiden  to  experiment  in  mid-nineteenth  century
philosophy of science” Daston points out, “it continued to be a fundamental scientific
practice  –  and  arguably  the  one  most  likely  to  generate  novelties,  including  new
ontologies”  (Daston 2008:  102).  This  reformulation  of  observation,  constructed  as  an
active way of “furnishing the universe” (Daston 2008: 100) with new ontologies, is what
Peirce is drawing from Whewell and applying to his own characterisation of the practices
and methods of delimiting the scope and boundaries of the sciences. More importantly,
Peirce’s  criticism  of  Whewell  points  to  a  distinctive  conceptual  preoccupation  that
renders  his  work  particularly  relevant  for  contemporary  debates  in  historical
epistemology. In separating ideas ‘from within’ and observations ‘from without’ Whewell
seems to display (admittedly in a peculiarly counterintuitive way) some of the traits that
would characterise the later, post-Kantian separation between (subjective) knowers and
(objective) world. As Daston points out, the quest for a neutral observation language, or
(before  that  distinctive  development  in  the  twentieth  century)  the  construction  of
observation as a mere registration of sense data “were Kantian dreams, made possible
only after the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity had established itself as the
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great epistemological divide among scientists as well as philosophers” (Daston 2008: 99).
Peirce himself  sensed  a  Kantian  flavour  coating  Whewell’s  discussion  of  the  divide
between ideas  and observations:  “Whewell’s  statement  [i.e.  that  discovery in  science
consists of ideas drawn from within and facts drawn from without] is Kantian in its form,
more Kantian than anybody” (R1274a: 4). Placing ‘innate’ or ‘natural’ ideas as guides for
observation hides an implicit view that the observation of facts remains an inherently
‘dumb’ and brute affair in the absence of a separate and higher set of conceptual skills.
This is precisely the view of observation that Peirce is trying to overturn by insisting on
the historicity and growth of ideas. In a similar vein, stressing the ‘innate’ and natural
character of ideas as guides to observations will not result in rendering observations, in
turn, more ‘natural’ in a strictly reductive biological sense. On the contrary, Peirce seems
to be claiming that Whewell’s lesson becomes far more effective when the line between
(passive) observations and (active) ideas is  challenged on historical  grounds.  When it
comes to complex human affairs, ‘natural’ and ‘historical’ lay on a continuum, and this is
the case not only for the iterative complementarity of ideas and observations, but also for
the  relevance  of  this  complementarity  within  Peirce’s  broader  account  of  the
classification of the sciences.
41 It  is  precisely this historicised and practice-specific notion of observation that Peirce
places at the core of his idea of a ‘natural’ classification of the sciences in R1336, the
manuscript that reflects the status of Peirce’s classification in the early 1890s with which
I opened this section. When the sciences are classified in respect to the characteristics of
their objects,” Peirce claims in a crucial passage, “those which depend upon different
kinds of observations are better separated and more according to nature than in any other
way” (R1336: 7, emphasis mine). Recall that earlier on in the manuscript Peirce presents a
differential view of classification: for a classificatory system to be significant, it should
contain “as many interesting extra points of distinction as possible” (R1336: 6) between
different kinds of sciences. But what exactly determines this difference? A first step could
be  to  tailor  classification around the  objects  of  investigation of  a  particular  kind of
inquiry: this would also be an intuitive way of justifying the status of a classification as
‘natural.’ This move, however, would not exhaust the empirical content of a classification
of the sciences. For objects themselves depend on the particular respects in which a certain
community of practitioner is trained to observe them: practitioners, rather than objects,
are  the  most  ‘natural’  content  of  a  classification  of  the  sciences,  and  form its  very
empirical  content.  Classification  is  observation-dependent  not in  the  sense  of  being
relative to  the  whim  of  particular  scientific  practitioners  (Peirce  would  reject  this
approach as a form of nominalism), but because observation, possessing an element of
generality, is itself the most ‘natural’ foundation upon which the order of the sciences
can be built. 
42 The idea of ‘natural’ classification persists in Peirce’s system, and is indeed a trait that
will be maintained all along, until his ‘perennial’ 1903 version of the classification of the
sciences. But it would be a mistake to consider this as a distinctive and unique feature of
Peirce’s classification. Nor is the comparison with Whewell’s account of how ideas furnish
a ‘natural’ guide to classify the sciences an isolated influence on Peirce. All nineteenth-
century  classifiers  subscribed  to  the  conviction  that  a  rational  organisation  of  the
sciences should be ‘natural.’ The trend was to model ‘natural’ on biological taxonomy, a
field that had been undergoing a revival at least since the previous century. As Csiszar
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points out, each nineteenth century classifier had his own preferred taxonomer as a point
of reference:
Against  the  nominalism  of  the  Encyclopédistes’ Buffon,  Comte  preferred  the
functionalist approach to taxonomy of Cuvier, Bentham championed the methods
of Linnaeus, while Ampère sang the praises of the Jussieu family’s natural method
of botanical classification. Each of them believed that their chosen naturalist had
finally  provided  them  a  method  that  would  make  it  possible  to  invent  a
classification of knowledge that was truly natural. (Csiszar 2010: 383)
43 For Peirce such a fundamental point of reference was Louis Agassiz, whose lectures he
had  attended  in  1860.  The  relationship  between  natural  classification  and  Agassiz’s
approach to taxonomy is something that Peirce discusses in detail in the 1902 Minute Logic
, in a projected chapter entitled “On Science and Natural Classes” (EP2: 115-32). Along
with providing important details of the sense in which a classification of the sciences
should be ‘natural,’ this particular piece lends substantial evidence to my contention that
Peirce used his classification as a form of ‘currency’ to enter the broader nineteenth-
century  debate  on how the  sciences  should  be  organised.  The  chapter  starts  with  a
reference to Ernest Cushing Richardson’s 1901 Classification.  Theoretical  and Practical,  a
work Peirce had reviewed for the Nation at the beginning of 1902 and found theoretically
poor,  but  practically  useful.19 Richardson’s  extensive  appendix,  containing
146 classifications of the sciences alongside to 173 archival systems for indexing subjects,
is  an illuminating example of the merging of epistemic and bureaucratic motivations
behind the impulse toward classification, as outlined by Csiszar (2010: 350). Each of the
146 scientific  classifications presented by Richardson,  Peirce claims in his  chapter on
“Science and Natural Classes,” aspires to be “the one and true classification” (EP2: 116).
But what is meant by a ‘natural’ class? Peirce notes that many of the previous classifiers
have  assumed that  referring  to  zoology  and  botany  may  be  sufficient  to  justify  the
metaphysical connotations of their use of the term ‘natural.’  However, “if botany and
zoology  must  perforce  rest  upon  metaphysics,  by  all  means  let  this  metaphysics  be
recognised as an explicit branch of those sciences and be treated in a thoroughgoing and
scientific manner” (EP2: 116). It is here that Agassiz offers a prime model of ‘natural’
classification. Peirce does not embrace his system in full – he specifically claims that his
classification “was put forward at a somewhat inauspicious moment” (EP2: 128n), so that
it was almost born out of date in light of the impact of Darwin’s ideas about evolution.
Nevertheless, at least Agassiz made his metaphysical commitments clear, explicit, and
somewhat ‘testable’ in contrast to his critics, whose classifications “are saturated with
metaphysics in its dangerous form – i.e., the unconscious form” (EP2: 128n). 
44 From Agassiz Peirce borrows two fundamental points. One is the subdivision of science
according to categories that Agassiz proposed for the natural  world:  branches,  classes,
orders, families, genera and species. A classification should, for Agassiz as well as for Peirce,
account for what sort of characters distinguish branches from branches,  classes from
classes and so on (ibid.). There is then a more fundamental point that Peirce borrows from
his former teacher: the notion that natural classifications should offer an arrangement of
its objects “according to the ideas from which their existence results” (EP2: 128n, emphasis
mine). Once again, ideas creep up in Peirce’s discussion of a natural classification, but here
Peirce adds an explicitly metaphysical layer to the characterisation of ideas as a criterion
for  classification that  he borrowed from Whewell  in the early  1890s.  The claim that
natural classes owe their existence to ideas, Peirce claims following Agassiz, amounts to
stating that natural classes are defined by final causes. Indeed Peirce openly claims that a
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lasting legacy of Agassiz’s classification consists precisely in “directing our attention to
the supreme importance of bearing in mind the final cause of objects in finding out their
own natural classification” (EP2: 129). Much has been written on Peirce’s account of final
causes (Short 1981; Short 2007; and Pape 1993), and an in-depth exegetic analysis of this
particular  aspect  of  his  philosophy  is  well  beyond the  scope  of  my  discussion.  It  is
important  to point  out,  however,  that  in this  particular  context  Peirce differentiates
clearly final causes from ‘purposes.’ A purpose is “merely that form of final cause which is
most familiar to our experience” (EP2: 120), whereas the meaning of final cause Peirce is
advancing with reference to a natural classification of  the sciences relates precisely to
“objects of [a] class deriving their existence from an idea” (EP2: 123). It is in fact from ideas
that the sciences derive their  genealogy:  just  like cellulose affords  opportunity for the
beauty of a rose, Peirce claims, so ideas afford opportunity for a natural organisation of
the sciences (EP2 122). This is a crucial connection that allows Peirce to establish a direct
link between a ‘natural’  classification and science as a living entity and as a pursuit
carried out by its practitioners. Peirce expresses this connection in a crucial passage,
which presents a distinctive pragmaticist flavour:
What I mean by the idea’s conferring existence upon the individual members of the
class is that it confers upon them the power of working out results in this world, that it
confers upon them, that is to say, organic existence, or, in one word, life. (EP2: 124)
45 A natural classification is thus neither the “exudation of living science” (EP2: 129) nor is it
the projection of an ideal image of science “such as the classifier hopes may sometime
exist” (EP2: 129). Instead, a natural classification of the sciences should afford the living
members of the scientific community the opportunity to work out results in the world.
This adds to Peirce’s classification a generative dimension, which is directly related to its
distinctive historicity. The two are complementary angles arising from Peirce’s claim that
all  natural  classification  is  “an  attempt  at  finding  the  true  genesis  of  the  objects
classified” (EP2: 127). By genesis Peirce means “not the efficient action which produces
the whole by producing the parts, but the final action which produces the parts because
they are needed to make the whole” (EP2: 127). Thus construed, classification is at the
same time real and ever-evolving: “genesis is production from ideas,” and as ideas grow
so do our classifications of the sciences. The historicity of Peirce’s classification derives
precisely from this constant articulation of ‘parts’ (that is, individual sciences) as they are
needed to make the whole of science, in a process that is both prompting practitioners to
reflect on how the sciences got where they got, and disclosing questions that still await
for a scientific answer. 
 
Peirce’s Classification, and the Writing of History
46 Along with the writing of R1336, the year 1892 is also the time in which a version of
Peirce’s classification of the sciences appears as the preface of the first Lowell Lecture in
the history of science (R 1274a [fig. 3]). The lectures were commissioned in late 1891, after
the  geologist  and  member  of  the  US  Geological  Survey  George  Ferdinand  Becker
recommended Peirce to Augustus Lowell as the ideal person who could cover the subject
of science and its history “with so much knowledge and acumen” (W8: ix). Peirce started
working on the lectures in February 1892 (W8: lxvii). This also coincides with a draft,
dated 13 February 1892 and composed on paper from the Century Club, of a classification
of the sciences organised “in their order of generality” (W8: 275 [fig. 4]). The two schemes
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do not present substantial conceptual differences and are themselves variations of the
classification that had appeared in the Century Dictionary entry on “Science” a year earlier,
in 1891. 
47 Peirce’s reflections on how ideas can serve as a guide for a ‘natural’ classification of the
sciences, as outlined in my discussion of R1336 in the previous section, offer a powerful
and overlooked commentary to the practical use of his classificatory scheme in the early
1890s.  This is  especially important in light of  the intense historical  work that would
characterise Peirce’s production in those years, and which culminated in 1898 with the
drafts  for  a  history  of  science  in  one  volume  for  the  editors  Putnam’s  Sons.  The
manuscript for the first Lowell Lecture prefaces Peirce’s classification with a somewhat
laconic statement: “It will  be convenient for the purpose of these lectures to use the
classification of the sciences shown in Diagram I” (R1274a [fig. 3]). Peirce does not expand
further in this particular manuscript.  In W8, the editors of the Peirce Edition Project
suggest that a further draft of the first Lowell Lecture (R 1337) could be viewed as a
commentary to the classificatory schemes Peirce developed in 1892 (W8: 447). 
 
Fig.3 R 1274a, Lecture I from Peirce’s Lowell Lectures in the History of Science
The Houghton Library, Harvard University
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Fig 4. R1347, The Sciences in their Order of Generality. Reprinted in W8: 275.
The Houghton Library, Harvard University
48 But while the annotations in W8 follow primarily how Peirce justifies the position of each
science in his scheme, I  would like to draw attention to a contextual explanation that
Peirce  provides  in  R1337,  and  which  he  sets  as  the  background  for  the  particular
organisation of the sciences in his classification: “All science is a development of primitive
ideas connected  with  growth”  (R1337:  1,  emphasis  mine).  This  is  an  important
qualification, one that brings the lectures on the history of science explicitly in dialogue
with the discussion of  the classification of  the sciences  outlined in R1336.  The basic
distinction  Peirce  outlines  between  the  sciences,  at  least  in  this  particular  draft,  is
between the two primitive ideas of self-preservation, guiding the physical sciences, and
reproduction, guiding the psychical sciences. “This dichotomy,” Peirce continues, “is the
most fundamental division of the sciences, Physics the knowledge of things and their
mutual forces; Psychics the knowledge of beings and their mutual influences” (R1337: 1).20
At  a  very  fundamental  level,  Peirce  is  here  articulating  the  insight,  developed from
Whewell, that ideas offer the most natural principle for a classification of the sciences. He
is  also  beginning  to  articulate  it  in  accordance  to  the  ‘genetic’  approach  he  would
delineate more precisely a few years later, in the 1902 Minute Logic: ‘genesis is production
from ideas’ (EP2: 127). Placing the primitive ideas of self-preservation and reproduction as
the rationale for his distinction between physical and psychical sciences, Peirce is here
once again delineating his classification in continuity with Whewell’s historical legacy,
and he is explicitly doing so in the context of his historical writings. 
49 A further important question arises from Peirce’s use of his classification of the sciences
as the preface of his Lowell Lectures. The continuity between Peirce’s writings from the
early 1890s helps us tracing precise connections as far as the context of his early versions
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of  the classification is  concerned.  But  this  does not  quite  explain why he deemed it
important to present a classification of the sciences in the opening of his lectures on the
history of science in the first place. Here my account departs from the narrow details of
Peirce’s text to move toward a historiographical hypothesis with broader implications. I
have argued in the previous section that one of the ways in which Peirce’s classification
qualifies  as  ‘natural’  lies  precisely  in  its  tracing  the  configuration  of  various  sub-
communities of  inquirers at  a specific point in history.  Transposed in the context of
historical inquiry – which is exactly how Peirce approaches the history of science in his
1892 Lowell Lectures – this entails that an account of the organisation of the sciences is
not  construed  as  a  mere  leftover  of  history,  emerging  only  once  progress  has  been
accomplished.  Instead,  Peirce’s  placing  a  classification  of  the  sciences  at  the  very
beginning of his history is a rhetorical move with a clear epistemological significance, a
reminder  that  the  historian’s  starting  point  is  always  a  more  or  less  internalised
classification of the present state of knowledge, a classification that functions as the entry
point and the springboard for the historian’s hypotheses about the past. A classification of
the  sciences as  the  preface  of  a  history  of  science is  thus  also  an  open  invitation  to
acknowledge that the present is not only the inevitable starting point of any historical
inquiry,  but  also  all  the  historian  ultimately  has  at  her/his  disposal  to  begin  that
investigation in earnest.  Rather than a historiographical limitation,  however,  Peirce’s
rhetorical gesture has the effect of turning that awareness into a critical, fallibilist tool at
the service of the practice of history. As Vincent Colapietro has highlighted, the broader,
thick historicity of Peirce’s theory of inquiry is itself a powerful conceptual device not to
obliterate, but “to establish the present as the meantime, the time between an indefinite
past and an equally indefinite future – to secure the present as a segment of time whose
relationship to antecedent and subsequent stretches of time makes the present itself, in
effect, a sign” (Colapietro 1996: 136). I claim that this view applies equally well to the case
of Peirce’s classification in the broader context of his historical writings. Caught in the
meantime of her/his current classificatory schemes, the historian is not a prisoner of the
present, but the responsible holder of a particular critical angle on the past: “Perspectives
are not prisons in which we are condemned to dwell in darkness,” Colapietro writes, “but
truly angles of vision” (Colapietro 1996: 137). What Peirce is providing by prefacing his
first lecture on the history of science with a classification of the sciences is precisely his
angle of vision, a statement of identity but also an acknowledgment of the responsibility
that  historians face in investigating the past  from the perspective of  a  present  they
cannot escape. 
50 My  historiographical  hypothesis  is  partly  substantiated  by  a  statement  that  Peirce
himself makes, and which can be found in the form of a handwritten annotation in a
rather surprising place. Possibly in parallel with his mature formulation of the ‘perennial’
classification, Peirce revisited his Century Dictionary entry on “Science”. His own copy at
the  Houghton  Library  contains  a  long  handwritten  extract  (fig. 5),  in  which  Peirce
provides an extensive, critical account of how his classification has changed since the
publication of the entry in 1891. But while the distinctively trichotomic articulation of his
classification clearly starts betraying the use of his categories as a principle to classify the
sciences (Atkins 2006),  the historiographical  significance of  his  classification,  and his
emphasis  on classification as  a  product  of  the present  seem to have remained fairly
stable.
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Fig. 5 Peirce’s annotations to the entry on Science in the Century Dictionary. R 1597: 5396v.
The Houghton Library, Harvard University
51 In the annotations, Peirce starts by referring to Coleridge’s definition of science in the
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana as “systematised knowledge,” which he contrasts to the older
meaning of episteme or scientia as knowledge by metaphysical principles. The definition
offered by Coleridge, who was himself one of the many nineteenth-century classifiers, is
what  Peirce  adopts  as  it  reflects  the  fact  that  “scientific  men,  when  they  speak  of
‘science,’ mean the life devoted to the single-minded pursuit of the truth” (R1597: 5396v).
Here Peirce is setting the ground for his (by then fairly well established) argument that a
classification  should  reflect  the  practices  of  its  living  practitioners.  But  it  is  the
immediately following paragraph that summarises possibly two decades of Peirce’s study
of the classification of the sciences, and that conveys the historical and historiographical
continuity of his investigation, independently of the changes he made to the logical form
of his classification. Peirce states:
I  have  carefully  examined upwards  of  a  hundred attempts  to  classify  the  sciences. The
majority  of  them  attempt  to  say  what  sciences  are  possible,  which  is  a  little
presumptuous. I am convinced that we can only form a natural classification of science in
its present state, looking forward just a little. The scheme of Comte (whoever originated
it)  must  be  the basis.  I  divide  all  theoretical  science into  sciences  of  discovery,
sciences of review (like Humboldt’s Cosmos, Comte’s Philosophie Positive and (in
the main)  the synthetic  philosophy of  H.  Spencer.  The classification of  sciences
itself, belongs in this division) and thirdly Practical Sciences whose purpose is to
subserve some other purpose than that of knowing. (R1597: 5396v, emphasis mine)
52 Behind the distinctive trichotomic character of the classification Peirce discusses in his
annotations, this statement lends support to the two alternative main lines of inquiry
into Peirce’s classification I have pursued in this paper. One is the historical claim that
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Peirce used his classification as a sort of ‘currency’ to enter the broader debate of how the
sciences should be organised, and who was entitled to have a say in that debate. As a
philosopher as well as a scientific practitioner, Peirce was naturally led toward a minute
dissection of the details of that discussion, a discussion in which his own identity was at
stake. The careful examination of ‘upwards of a hundred attempts to classify the sciences’
is at the same time an intellectual pursuit in its own right and an act of responsibility that
Peirce performed toward the community of inquirers that formed the very recipient of
his philosophy and his science, and without which neither his philosophy nor his practice
as a scientist would be possible in the first place. 
53 At the same time,  Peirce reiterates,  perhaps more forcefully,  the fact  that  a  natural
classification  is  always  a  result  of  being  “caught  in  the  meantime,”  to  return  to
Colapietro’s (1996: 136) powerful metaphor: “We can only form a natural classification of
science in its present state, looking forward just a little,” he claims. This is in line with the
second line of inquiry I have pursued in the course of this paper, one that fleshed out how
Peirce’s classification aimed to furnish an “angle of vision,” at the same time serving as
the very starting point of inquiry – historical (how science got where it is,  why here
rather than anywhere else) as well as scientific (what questions are still being generated
by the current configuration and evolving relations between the sciences). Drawing on a
metaphor that Peirce perhaps would not have endorsed – but one that capitalises on an
insight from his close friend William James – his classification of the sciences, reframed in
these terms, takes on the function of the historian’s specious present: not a “knife edge” –
to use James’ (1983: 574) lucid phrasing – separating an imperfect past from the glorious
future of science, but “a saddle back with a breadth of its own,” upon which the historian
sits perched, looking simultaneously in two directions into time. 
 
Conclusions
54 In pointing out the fracture between Peirce’s 1903 classification of the sciences and his
earlier efforts, Peirce scholars miss an important opportunity to follow a range of crucial
historical and historiographical insights deriving directly from the contextualisation of
such an important part of his philosophy. This seems to be in line with the internalist
treatment  that  Peirce’s  philosophy  has  been  subject  to  more  broadly,  and  that  has
occasionally  generated  the  distorted  image,  at  least  outside  the  immediate  realm of
Peirce scholarship,  of  an isolated and genial  thinker,  whose points of reference were
mainly to be found in an extensive and dusty library of classics. Peirce was certainly in
part this, but he was also much more. He was a prolific writer immersed in the most lively
scientific debates of his time, and his classification of the sciences is evidence of how
much his philosophical concerns were shaped by the social context and social debates
that surrounded and permeated his philosophical views. While it was not my aim in this
paper to offer a complete social history of Peirce’s classification of the sciences, I have
tried as much as possible to show that there is much to gain from reconciling a sustained
historical  contextualisation of  his  work with a  careful  analysis  of  its  epistemological
message. 
55 The account of the early life of Peirce’s classification I have presented in this paper has
hopefully delineated two possible new avenues of inquiry into Peirce’s classification of
the  sciences.  Both  revolve  around  the  distinctive  historicity of  Peirce’s  project.  In
recontextualising Peirce’s classification as a quintessentially nineteenth-century pursuit,
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I have tried to reconcile a traditionally internalist account of Peirce’s classificatory scheme
with broader externalist  attempts at  investigating the debate around the order of  the
sciences in the nineteenth century. Peirce was a key actor in that debate, with precise
views on the coordination of the scientific enterprise,  ‘natural’  classification, and the
limitations of alternative classificatory schemes. More importantly, Peirce’s sources and
his own writings on the subject place him precisely in that transitional area where the
bureaucratic impulse driving classification merged with the epistemic quest for a rational
organisation of knowledge. Being versed in both fields, Peirce had a great deal to add to
the whole enterprise, and as I argued he used his classification as the ‘currency’ to gain
access to the debate. 
56 But the historicity of Peirce’s classification emerged also in my investigation of the uses
of his scheme as a preface to his historical writings of the 1890s. It is not a coincidence, I
argued, that a classification of the sciences, almost with no additional elaboration, was
offered to the audience of his Lowell Lectures in the history of science. Here Peirce’s main
achievement is to show that historical inquiry is by its nature inevitably bound to an
inescapable  presentism:  historians  somehow always start  from a  classification  of  the
sciences as their ‘angle of vision.’ Interpreting Peirce’s work through the framework of
historical  epistemology  has  however  offered  the  possibility  of  turning  this  inherent
limitation into a virtue of historical practice: by prefacing his history with a classification
of the sciences Peirce explicitly took responsibility for the inherent contingency that
inevitably characterised his own view of the organisation of knowledge, thus turning it
into a critical and fallibilist tool. 
57 Peirce’s classification of the sciences has still much to offer, beyond what emerged in my
initial, tentative overview. Far from being an ‘antique bijoux’ (to use one of Peirce’s most
felicitous tongue-in-cheek expressions) to be consigned to the dust of our archives, the
vicissitudes of the classification of the sciences in the nineteenth century are one of the
richest fields of investigation we have inherited from history. That Peirce was right at the
centre  of  this  debate  is  itself  one  of  the  many  contingencies  of  history;  that  he
deliberately decided to have a say in it is an opportunity that Peirce scholars should
embrace in full.
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NOTES
1. The  nineteenth  century  was  a  century  of  standardisation,  which  ranged  from  units  of
measurement (Schaffer 1992 and 1998) to taxonomic practices (Bonneuil 2002) to time (Galison
2003). 
2. Two frequently cited, albeit rather outdated, sources on this particular issue are Dolby 1997,
which views the emergence of classifications as distinctive of the systematic scientific spirit of
the  nineteenth  century,  and  Kedrov  1964,  which  traces  the  origins  of  the  trend  toward
classification in dialectical materialism.
3. It is in Bentham’s Chrestomathia that the terms coenoscopy and idioscopy appear, terms that were
used by Peirce in his own classification of the sciences to refer respectively to philosophy and the
special sciences.
4. As Simon Schaffer notes, Bentham’s Chrestomathia is one of the first texts in which ‘technology’
is used in its modern sense “as the aggregate body of the several sorts of manual operations
directed to the purpose of art” (Schaffer 2013: 66).
5. On Bell’s “Madras System,” as a distinctively colonial, as well as industrial, educational pursuit
see Schaffer (2013: 68ff).
6. Whewell  introduced the term in a discourse presented at  the 1833 meeting of  the British
Association. See Yeo (1993: 110-1).
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7. For a wide-ranging account of Whewell’s intellectual engagement in the cultural, theological
and scientific climate of the Victorian period see Fisch & Schaffer 1991. 
8. A standard complete translation of Comte’s works does not exist at present. In what follows, I
will cite from Harriette Martineau’s (condensed) English translation.
9. On  the  relationship  (or  lack  thereof!)  between  Comte’s  positivism  and  twentieth-century
positivism see Laudan 1971; Tresch (2012, esp. 255-6); and Bourdeau 2015.
10. An important clarification is that, for Comte, different sciences may be at different stages of
development at a given time in history. Thus, for example, astronomy was a prime case of a
science which had firmly reached the positive stage in Comte’s time, while sociology, being the
youngest in his series, was still on its way to becoming fully ‘positive.’ 
11. Spencer insisted that he was barely aware of Comte’s works at least until as late as 1852,
however  some commentators  have advanced the  hypothesis  that  he  was  more familiar  with
Comte’s writings than he claimed to be, primarily via George Eliot and George Henry Lewes, both
strong admirers of Comte. See Eisen (1967: 48-9).
12. Kent  notes  that  Peirce’s  classifications  start  at  least  as  early  as  1866,  although  she
reconstructs many of his early schemes from the text as they were not presented in a tabular
form (Kent 1987: 90ff). In the course of my discussion, I will prioritise tabular or diagrammatic
arrangements of Peirce’s classification. The PEP now marks R1347 (1892) as ‘his most mature
diagrammatic development of disciplinary classification,’  as well  as ‘a datable and significant
milestone in the development of Peirce’s classification of the sciences’ (W8. 646). As far less work
has  been  produced  on  Peirce’s  classifications  of  the  1890s,  and  as  these  classifications
interestingly relate to Peirce’s works on the history of science, in what follows I will use that
particular decade as the starting point of my discussion. 
13. That Peirce disagreed with Spencer’s philosophy on broader grounds is evident, for example,
from his 1891 review of his Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative (W8: 242-4). 
14. The text of the article is a broader rejoinder to Carus’ comments on Peirce’s architectonic and
his account of chance, as exposed in his Monist Metaphysical Series (1891-1892).
15. The relationship between Hanson and Peirce, especially on the issue of observation, deserves
a discussion of its own, which is beyond the scope of this article (see Lund 2010: Ch. 3) for a
productive attempt in this direction). At a basic level, one of the possible criticisms that can be
made  to  Hanson’s  approach  is  that,  despite  its  standing  out  as  a  pioneering  attempt  at
vindicating observation, it still relegates it to the realm of brute, uneducated perception (hence
the role of theory as an indispensable framework to enable interpretation). A criticism along
these lines has been proposed by Daston 2008 and Daston & Lunbeck 2011. On the other hand,
Hanson’s emphasis on seeing not merely amounting to the “having of a visual experience,” but
also to “the way in which that experience is had” (Hanson 1972: 15) seems to suggest a far more
nuanced stance, and one that is much closer to Peirce’s. 
16. For the sake of simplicity, here I am only discussing Peirce’s view of observation, however it
must be pointed out that his account of observation would later converge into his theory of
perception,  to the point that the two are extremely difficult  to detangle.  Peirce’s  account of
perceptual  judgments,  and more generally of  the inferential  nature of  perception (which for
Peirce is inherently abductive, and which he models on sight), is fully articulated in his 1903
Lectures on Pragmatism. There Peirce exposes his three cotary propositions: 1) nihil est in intellectu
quin prius non fuerit in sensu, which Peirce reads as “in perceptual judgments (in sensu) we find the
source of a sign’s meaning (intellectus)”; 2) “perceptual judgments contain general elements”; 3)
“perceptual judgments are to be regarded as extreme cases of abductive inferences” (EP2, 226-7).
On the relation between observation and perception in Peirce see Viola (2012: 117-22).
17. Whewell did not dismiss Bacon per se – indeed he considered his work as a continuation of
the Baconian project. He did think that Baconian induction should be revived and ‘renovated’ –
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and indeed one of the volumes of the third edition of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences bears
the title of “Novum Organon Renovatum,” with explicit reference to Bacon. See Snyder 2012.
18. Here  I  am  presenting  Peirce’s  interpretation  of  Whewell’s  views,  however  it  is  open  to
question whether Whewell’s conception of ideas was really as intuitionist as Peirce presents it.
Laura Snyder (2012), for example, stresses that for Whewell “fundamental ideas and conceptions
are provided by our minds, but they cannot be used in their innate form.” Instead, they have to
be  subject  to  a  process  of  ‘unfolding,’  which  Whewell  referred  to  as  “the  explication  of
conceptions” (Snyder 2012). 
19. In his review, Peirce reproaches Richardson for having forgotten his own entry on “Science”
in the Century Dictionary as an additional example of classification of the sciences. See (CN 3: 62).
20. The draft continues with a discussion of the standard form of Peirce’s classification of the
sciences:  thus mathematics is  considered the first  and widest  branch of  science,  followed by
philosophy (only divided into logic and metaphysics at that point). The third order of science is
occupied by nomology, divided into physical and psychical. Chemistry occupies the fourth order
of science, followed by the physics of the ether as the fifth order, and biology as the sixth. The
seventh  order  of  science  features  sociology  and  only  in  the  eight  order  Peirce  places  “the
sciences which treat of individual objects or collections of objects” (R1337: 8), such as cosmology
and history. 
ABSTRACTS
The classification of the sciences is one of the most discussed and analysed aspects of Peirce’s
corpus of work. I propose that Peirce’s attempt at systematising the sciences is characterised by a
distinctive historicity, which I construe in two complementary senses. First, I investigate Peirce’s
classification as part of a broader nineteenth-century move toward classifying the sciences, a
move that was at the same time motivated by social and epistemological goals. I claim that this
re-contextualisation  adds  an  entirely  new  layer  to  the  otherwise  distinctively  internalist
readings of Peirce’s classification. I then look at how Peirce’s scheme, especially in the form it
displayed in the early 1890s, relates to his own historical writings, particularly his history of
science.  Looking  at  Peirce  as  a  historical  actor  in  his  own  right  through  the  lens  of  his
classification,  I  claim,  is  indispensable  to  understand  the  contemporary  relevance  of  his
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